## 1AC

#### Take my blood.

**Take my death shroud and**

**The remnants of my body.**

**Take photographs of my corpse at the grave, lonely.**

**Send them to the world,**

**To the judges and**

**To the people of conscience,**

**Send them to the principled** ~~men~~ **[ones] and the fair-minded.**

**And let them bear the guilty burden, before the world,**

**Of this innocent soul.**

**Let them bear the burden, before their children and before**

**history,**

**Of this wasted, sinless soul,**

**Of this soul which has suffered at the hands of the “protectors**

**of peace.”**

**--Jumah al Dossari**

(gender modified)

#### Guantanamo Bay does not exist – the US military industrial complex has patched together a *simulacrum* of the detention center which now dominates the public’s consciousness and whitewashes the daily violence of Guantanamo. Through this simulacrum, the Global War on Terror is justified

Veeren, 11

Elspeth van Veeren, PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex focusing on the production of meaning in world politics through an exploration of the material and visual practices at Joint Task Force Guantánamo; “Guantánamo does not exist: Simulation and the production of ‘the real’ Global War on Terror,” 10/7/2011, Journal of War and Culture Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, pg. 193-206 //bghs-ms

Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantánamo, the high-profile US military detention and inter- rogation operation, was established in January 2002 to house the ‘worst of the worst’ of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It nevertheless became a public spectacle that was essential for constituting the reality of a Global War on Terror. Through evolving media and VIP tours of the facilities coupled with the Bush administration’s military analyst programme (a system of reverse embeds used to promote Pentagon messages within the U.S. media), Guantánamo became a simulation essential for producing the reality of the war. It became a key way to convince the public that the war was real and necessary, but also that its conduct was just and humane, and therefore, by extension, that the United States can be understood as ‘good’. Through a triple screen of the tours, the visitors and their mediation, the telegenic spectacle of Guantánamo was transmuted into a reality of Guantánamo as ‘safe, humane, legal and transparent’. The importance of this for producing understandings of the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) bears closer examination. Without this triple screen, Guantánamo does not exist. INTRODUCTION¶ In the summer of 2005, at the height of controversies surrounding the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) relating to the US military’s rendition, detention and interrogation practices, the Bush administration and US military decided to launch a new public relations offensive in order to ‘set the record straight’ and address criticisms levelled at the US military (Sidoti 2005). Rather than relying on traditional press briefings and journalist reports, the Bush administration mobilized its military analyst programme and expanded tours of the facilities at Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantánamo. The programme, developed in 2002 to gain ‘information dominance’ over the way that the Iraq War and the wider GWoT were depicted, involved deploying retired senior military officers as talking heads on network television to provide favourable coverage of the war (Barstow 2008). The retired officers, who marketed themselves as independent commentators, toured Guantánamo in 2005 and then appeared on US television networks and across a range of media to describe their visit. Based on the credibility generated by their years of military experience, and appearing impartial, they acted as ‘message force multipliers’ while delivering the administration’s themes and messages to millions of Americans. In a position somewhat analogous to that of journalists ‘embedded’ with US military units, military analysts, such as retired General Don Sheppherd, acted as reverse embeds and appeared to provide a window into the ‘reality’ of operations at Guantánamo and by extension provided assurances as to the effectiveness and appropriateness of US military actions.¶ Due in large part to these tours and the reverse embeds that promoted them, the surreal goings on at Guantánamo – such as the detainee claims of innocence and torture taken as evidence of their guilt; the military commissions in which detainees were told what to say; the visits of celebrities such as Miss Universe to the site; or even the pride with which tour guides describe Pepsi as detainees’ favourite drink or pronounced pecan flavour Ensure as the favourite of those being force-fed – remained underreported in the mainstream US media. The Guantánamo that detainees and critics of the site described as beyond belief, dreamlike and disconnected from reality in its illegality and abusiveness, was supplanted by a reality in which Guantánamo was consistent with the ‘spirit of the Geneva Conventions’, ‘state of the art’, was ‘safe, humane, legal and transparent’ (which became its official motto), a ‘club med’ for terrorists, and even ‘better than they deserved’ (Anon 2005). Despite sustained high-profile criticism, both nationally and internationally, including the continued circulation of the controversial photographs of the original days of detention at the site, a majority of Americans continued to support the existence of JTF-Guantánamo and the efforts of US forces there as a ‘front line’ in the GWoT.¶ At the heart of the creation and management of this reality of Guantánamo was therefore its media profile, its spectacle. In keeping with recent trends in the ways that wars are (re)presented, Guantánamo became part of an ‘unreal’ form of warfare (Keeble 1997: 8), in which the GWoT was essentially a ‘media event’ (Hammond 2011: 314). ‘[S]taging the spectacle of war has become a substitute for an inspiring cause to rally public support, and media presentation has consequently become even more central’ (Hammond 2011: 314). Military policy in the GWoT, and in particular with regard to Guantánamo, was therefore developed with an awareness of how it might appear on CNN and be viewed by the public (Robinson 2002: 40). Guantánamo, established as a high- profile facility in order to demonstrate the existence of the ‘worst of the worst’ of al-Qaeda and the Taliban captured on the ‘battlefield’, was consequently a public spectacle that was essential for developing an understanding of what the GWoT meant. Guantánamo was not used as propaganda or as dissimulation, but, as Philip Hammond suggests with regard to the GWoT more broadly, as a simulation, even a *simulacrum* (Baudrillard 1994a) of war. As a spectacle, it was used to convince the public first, that the war was ‘real’ (Hammond 2011: 315) and necessary, that its conduct was just, and therefore, by extension, that the United States can be understood as ‘good’. As Jean Baudrillard suggested, ‘what is at stake [. . .] is war itself: its status, its meaning, its future. It is beholden not to have an objective but to prove its very existence’ (Baudrillard 1995: 32). The information management characteristic of the tours and the military analyst programme was intended to communicate, to simulate through the ‘telegenic spectacle’ (Pugliese 2008) a reality of the GWoT as meaningful and purposeful. Second, this version of the reality of Guantánamo and the GWoT relied not only on the constitution of indefinite detention as necessary but also on a sanitized version of it. Guantánamo, alongside the language of ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘clean’ warfare characteristic of modern warfare, was used to produce an understanding of war, and by extension the United States, as not only ‘modern’ and ‘humane’ but to construct what modern and humane meant and looked like. In so doing, Guantánamo was therefore part of the performance of a national identity that is always in need of securing (Campbell 1998; Dillon 1996; Weber 1998). While the GWoT and the Iraq War in particular have been studied for insights into new approaches to media in the prosecution of the war (Croft 2006; Hammond 2007; Martin and Petro 2006), in particular the use of ‘mil-blogs’ (Wall 2005), embedded journalists (Cottle 2006; Hiebert 2003), the rise of virtual warfare and merging of entertainment with news (Debrix 2008; Der Derian 2003, 2009; Van Veeren 2009), the unique use of Guantánamo as a telegenic spectacle for constructing the reality of this war remains unexamined. Bringing a poststructuralist lens to Guantánamo, and in particular the works of Jean Baudrillard and James Der Derian, noted for their theorizing of modern warfare and the role of mediation and simulation, and applying a material- discursive analytic approach (Laclau and Mouffe 1987) to bear on the tourist practices associated with Guantánamo, this article argues that Guantánamo was a simulation used to produce a reality of war.¶ Through the ‘triple screen’ of Guantánamo as mediated through the constructed spectacle, the touring celebrities, and finally through the military analyst programme, each of which are discussed in turn, a simulation of Guantánamo was created, which played a key role in both producing the war and sanitizing the violence of it. Due to the media policies adopted by the US military and Bush administration, Guantánamo became a site in which the signs of the real bore limited relation to the operations of life ‘inside the wire’, nor needed to. The telegenic spectacle filtered through the ‘triple screen’ produced a reality of Guantánamo and the GWoT. Guantánamo can therefore best be understood as a creation of these mediations; the ‘real’ Guantánamo does not exist.

#### This securitized performance of Guantanamo as clean and humane is part and parcel of the military industrial complex’s justification of the Global War on Terror --- it serves to legitimize the pseudo-war while masking its violence

Veeren, 12

Elspeth van Veeren, PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex focusing on the production of meaning in world politics through an exploration of the material and visual practices at Joint Task Force Guantánamo; “Clean War, Invisible War, Liberal War: The Clean and Dirty Politics of Guantánamo,” 3/19/2002 //bghs-ms

The Global War on Terror (GWoT) now ranks as one of the costliest and most extensive wars of the last 100 years and is certainly one of the largest counter-terrorism operations in history.1 Beginning with President Bush’s speech on 16 September 2001 declaring a ‘war on terror’ and continuing over ten years later, the GWoT has cost $1.121 trillion in Pentagon war appropriations, and is set to exceed $4 trillion once debt repayments and the costs of caring for veterans are considered. It has included the mobilization and deployment of military force by some 40 states in several countries, most notably Afghanistan and Iraq; entailed covert operations in several additional locations; reinvigorated US foreign military assistance programmes and facilitated transformations in foreign policy; led to major increases in military and intelligence spending in the United States and elsewhere; justified the creation of the Department of Homeland Security; enabled the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act which included substantial implications for civil liberties within the United States such as extended domestic surveillance and intelligence-gathering programmes; and most recently, facilitated the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 which controversially included the provision for allowing the military to detain indefinitely non-US and US citizens deemed terrorists.2 The GWoT has also led to extensive human costs including the death of as many as 252,000 civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as uncounted numbers injured; the death of 6,000 US soldiers and the injury of over 30,000 more (excluding coalition forces, journalists, aid workers and contractors). It has contributed to the displacement of millions of Iraqis and Afghans from their homes; the detention of over 100,000 people at sites around the world, including CIA ‘ghost sites’. It has been used to justify the extension of extraordinary rendition and ‘harsh interrogation’ programmes, and the transformation of norms around torture, detention and targeted killing. It has produced scandals such as the abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention centre (the revelation that US interrogators systematically tortured Iraqi detainees, some sexually), as well as ongoing controversies associated with the US detention and interrogation site established at Guantánamo in January 2002.3¶ A war of this scale ‘could not be initiated and sustained without widespread public consent or at least acquiescence . . . without beliefs and forms of knowledge [in this case] about the nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism’.4 In other words, such a vast amount of political and military activity and investment requires the development and deployment of a set of knowledges and associated practices to justify and normalize decisions associated with the GWoT. The public at home (and to a degree abroad) must understand that the war is both necessary and achievable, but also legitimate, good and just. And while there is an extensive literature exploring the GWoT in connection with the ‘Just War’ tradition and its interpretation, this chapter’s aim is to explore the ways in which ideas about what is ‘just’ are communicated, in this case to explore the interconnections between ‘just’, ‘humane’ and ‘clean’.5¶ Importantly, these sets of knowledges and practices produce a ‘common sense’ or ‘reality’ of war based on the ways in which the conflict and its actors are constructed.6 Producing the legitimacy for war and related security measures requires the construction of a form of danger or threat and, by implication, the means by which the threat should be addressed.7 Since World War Two, wars fought by the United States have involved the construction of an American identity built around the idea of the United States as an advanced western liberal democracy committed to the rule of law and the freedom of the market against the threat posed by communism. Under President Jimmy Carter, and following the Vietnam War, this construction evolved to include respect for human rights. With the support of Congress, the United States was cast as a global beacon of human rights principles and standards with foreign aid and security policies tied, at least in rhetoric, to human rights records. Thus, a national security-human rights nexus was produced that the United States has navigated ever since, and which has necessitated a defence of its own human rights record at home and abroad.8 Key to the legitimacy of the GWoT was therefore the continued construction of the United States as waging a good war not only to bring terrorists to justice and safeguard American citizens, but to do so humanely with respect for human rights as expressed in the National Security Strategy of 2002.9 Thus when the United States sought to suspend normal judicial processes in connection with the new perceived security threat of terrorism, and committed acts that conflicted with liberal values and its human rights message – including reinterpreting the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention against Torture concerning the treatment of detainees – it had to do so in a way that worked within this national security-human rights nexus. On the one hand, US officials maintained a construction of the GWoT as a national security crisis, as an exceptional threat requiring exceptional measures and ‘whatever it takes’.10 On the other hand, they minimized, concealed or transformed these departures so as to maintain the construction of the state as a ‘humane’ actor and that of the GWoT as a ‘clean war’, one where international laws and norms are respected, where violence is restricted such that the risk to civilian life and to ‘friendly forces’ is minimized, and where practices such as torture and the use of weapons of mass destruction are prohibited.11¶ As is argued here, Guantánamo in particular became a central plank in the US Administration’s efforts to produce constructions of the GWoT as a ‘clean war’ and maintain an image of the United States as a champion of human rights. Despite the many controversies surrounding Guantánamo’s use as a detention and interrogation facility – its misidentifications, disappearances, indefinite detention, extended solitary confinement, harsh interrogation/torture, denial of legal rights, forced feeding, deaths in custody and questions surrounding the overall militarization of criminal law and the extent of presidential power – it nevertheless evolved into, and remains, a key way to imagine the war and therefore to convince the public that the war was necessary and that its conduct was just and humane. Following the scandal associated with the arrival of the first detainees and their housing in wire-mesh cages, the frame of Guantánamo was shifted and the site was reconstructed as exemplifying liberal values as a ‘safe, humane, legal, [and] transparent’ way to detain and interrogate enemies.12 Compared to sustained international criticism of the site, public opinion within the United States continued to reflect an understanding of the site as a necessity and as consistent with international standards for the treatment of detainees: a poll taken in 2005 found that as many as seven out of ten respondents considered that detainees were being treated ‘better than they deserve’ or ‘about right’.13¶ To support these views, Guantánamo’s various official (and semi-official) representations produced by Bush administration officials and consistently repeated by members of Congress underlined the professional, modern and technologically sophisticated nature of the site while erasing (sometimes literally through disappearances) detainees as political subjects with ‘grievable lives’.14 Images of interrogations were concealed, detainee individual identities erased, detention practices reframed, conditions rewritten as ‘too good’, guards recast as victims and resistance practices reappropriated. But as the understanding and image of what constitutes ‘clean war’ is constantly shifting, the aim of the state in producing legitimacy for war is both to present an image of the state as engaged in a ‘clean war’ and to define what clean means. Guantánamo played a role in redefining what ‘clean war’ looks like.¶ In short, the emergence of Guantánamo’s ‘clean’ language and imagery – which maps being ordered, tidy and hygienic onto the metaphorical sense of legal, precise and proportionate – helped to generate legitimacy for the war. It helped to render the violence of war (its dirtiness) invisible and thus to create an overall context in which the GWoT was legitimate. Guantánamo, alongside terminology such as ‘surgical strikes’, ‘smart weapons’ and other expressions characteristic of the ‘clean’ language of modern warfare, was used not only to produce an understanding of war, and by extension of the United States, as ‘humane’ and ‘clean’, but also to construct what humane meant and looked like. Guantánamo was therefore part of the performance of a national identity that is always in need of securing**.**

#### The media’s justification of the Global War on Terror underpins modern racism and causes endless intervention

Valenzuela, 5

Manuel Valenzuela, social critic and commentator, international affairs analyst and Internet columnist; The Making of the Enemy, 19 December 2005, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Why\_They\_Hate\_Us/Making\_Enemies.html

Hidden behind dark corners, lurking underneath beds, **fantasy bogeymen** not known or understood are mutated by marketers and propagandists who understand human psychology well into demons haunting the deep and frail recesses of the human mind. Humans not known or understood, alien in culture and language, masked in foreign appearance and color are easily transformed into creatures evil and degenerate, threats to the vitality of so-called freedom and democracy. For ignorance invariably leads to fear of the unknown and, if propagandized correctly, an entire population can be easily manipulated into allowing itself to be controlled and exploited by the Establishment. The ingrained mammalian instinct of security, both of the citizenry and that of their children, can be easily exploited by the corporatists, made to be of paramount importance, manipulated as only being made secure by purchasing the products of the corporation and by acquiescing to the draconian measures of the state. Through the televised media, the attempt to birth perpetual fear into the populace has never been easier to accomplish. Images, sound and opinion can be bombarded day in and day out to the easily receptive American citizen, many of which have become dumbed-down couch potatoes spoon fed their thoughts through the monitor they have become addicted to. Through the manipulation of televised images and sounds, the doctors of propaganda can hypnotize and control the thoughts of Americans, using all tools at their disposal to concoct the perfect bogeymen. The evildoers designed to captivate the fear-controlled mind of the masses are created to serve the interests of the Establishment, helping to steer the population in the direction most beneficial to the elite while at the same time working to mobilize millions into supporting the activities and illegalities ultimately detrimental to the people themselves. During the so-called Cold War, for example, the enemy created was the dreaded Soviet Communist, birthed to unleash terror in the dreams of average Americans. At the time, America's military industrial complex, along with the omnipresent corporate world, saw that a nation in a perpetual war footing could be more readily controlled, its people made to serve the interests of the Establishment. Using a cocktail of jingoism, nationalism, xenophobia, fear mongering and hate baiting, the propagandists were successful in breeding a hatred of anything related to Soviet Russia, including its innocent citizens. Through the control of the masses, manipulated to accept and even demand a perpetual war footing, profits to corporations became enormous, power over government became real and control over the course of America became a reality. With the population in the stupor of fear and hatred, dominated by fascinations of nationalism and sensationalistic displays of greatness, its collective mind occupied by the rabid pursuit of Soviet defeat, the corporatist dominion over America, as well as the Third World, triumphed, giving rise to a geopolitical chess match for corporate control over the lands, resources and peoples of the underdeveloped world. This game, a fight for profit, power and hegemony, resulted in the ceaseless poverty, disease, under-education, exploitation and death of millions of human beings, for generations now their destinies made to subsist in endemic poverty, with talents eroded and lives in perpetual limbo, their lands and economies still to this day not having recovered from the devastation the Cold War years spawned. Just like the corporatist elite were able to control their own masses, conquer the resources, lands and peoples of the south, thereby enriching themselves beyond compare, manipulating Cold War indoctrinated fears and hatreds to silence, control and make indifferent the masses, using the media to maintain a state of ignorance throughout the nation, so now in the Middle East and Central Asia do they see the grand prize: further empowerment over us as well as control of the world's remaining underground fields of oil. Once again, an enemy has been conveniently manufactured out of the dark rooms of Madison Avenue focus groups to fit nicely into the agenda of the corporatists and neocons in power. Serving the interests of the corporatists, fundamentalist Islamicists, of which only a small minority exists willing to commit violence, make a great enemy from which to hypnotize the population: unknown, alien, of different culture and language, existing in multiple desired states, dark skinned, invisible, violent and perhaps most importantly, of a religious belief system at odds with the fundamentalist Christian orthodoxy dominant in today's America. The systemic marketing of Muslims and Arabs and Persians as external threats capable of destroying our way of life, our religious norms, and the cherished charades of freedom and democracy is, therefore, the perfect weapon launched against the masses, for naturally we impute the actions of a minute lunatic fringe with all Muslim people, allowing the terror of a few miscreants to penetrate our fragile psyches and our even more fragile belief structure. Through the methodical brainwashing used in Hollywood and the corporate media, the Arab/Persian is made to be a rabid demon wishing death upon our children's future, ready at any moment to blow himself up, committing heinous acts of barbarity, murdering and bombing and rampaging, for he is a terrorist, the descendant of the Soviet, the next adaptation of American enemy, the next marketable wonder the corporatists exploit to enrapture our minds and control our lives. The Arab/Persian as enemy serves to militarize the mind of the population, to distract us from more ominous, internal threats, to control and brainwash the weaker minded among us, creating a marching army of "good Germans." **It helps mobilize the country towards a perpetual war footing**, acting as an excuse to wage war, to increase the profits and wealth and power of the corporatists, and to further lead America down the road to eventual fascism. Through war the military-energy-industrial complex and the corporate world can further engorge themselves, using the energy and wages of the masses for the construction of their weapons of death and suffering. Through war they can lay claim to the resources of the Middle East, the all-important lifeline to continued economic dominance. Using Arabs and/or Persians - who just happen to be native peoples of the Middle East, the very same lands saturated with underground fields of oil that the military-energy industrial complex craves - as the new American enemy gives our corporatist government the perfect excuse to invade, occupy and devastate desired lands with American imposed capitalism. Accorded the face of evildoer extraordinaire, stereotyped and marginalized through the lens of fiction, the Arab/Persian people, diverse and complex, unknown to the undereducated, act as the key to unlocking the American people's historical reluctance to fight wars both immoral and of choice. If the Arab/Persian can be demonized to be hated and feared by a population brainwashed by the *hypnotizing glare of television*, the nation will be much easier to militarize, the people's children will be much easier to enlist as cannon fodder and the internal policies of the nation will be much easier to control and manipulate. The sustained viability of the nation's militarization - and some would say the ongoing embezzlement of the people's treasure by corporatists - desired by corporatists in power **depends on** the Arab and Persian and **Muslim people remaining**, in the conscious of the masses, forever **an enemy**, always a demon, their reputation strong enough to make of them a most potent adversary, capable of hijacking airplanes, destroying skyscrapers and threatening to strike fear amongst the population, as always hating our way of life. What better scapegoat than the Arab/Persian population if one wants to conquer the resources of the Middle East and Central Asia? What greater marketing ploy could be manufactured to make enemies of the same people whose resources you desire? And, with the war on terror acting as a vicious circle of recruitment, by becoming a self fulfilling prophesy, having violence beget violence, with more and more Arabs incensed at the actions of America, ready to join in jihad where only few extremists existed before, (Al-Qaeda has become a mass movement, franchised and claimed by many insurgents, most of whom have never met a real member of the group) thereby creating ever more non-fictitious enemies, the military-energy industrial complex has the capacity and will to continue the war into perpetuity, using the anger on the Muslim street, along with the fear and hatred of Americans, to further its own interests, exploiting both Muslim and American, pitting one against the other, creating fictitious conflict where none exists, concocting enemies out of two peoples whose similarities as humans quashes our differences of culture. For a citizenry made to fear an alien people of which little is known about, with hatred and xenophobia running through their veins, programmed by the keepers at the gate to demand blood and death, can, at the push of a few psychological buttons, be mobilized into a war frenzy where the human brain, thinking, analytical and logical, is set aside and replaced by our primitive, mammalian brain, full of primordial behaviors and emotions. Once the population's collective *conscious has mutated* according to the designs of their puppeteers the march towards war, invasion and occupation can commence.

#### The War on Terror is part of the sovereign’s ability to exploit fundamental flaws in the legal system and continue the global biopolitical war – the ballot should side with the global countermovement against such violence – refuse the line

**Gulli, 13** - professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, (Bruno, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 1)

We live in an unprecedented time of crisis. The violence that characterized the twentieth century, and virtually all known human history before that, seems to have entered the twenty-first century with exceptional force and singularity. True, this century opened with the terrible events of September 11. However, September 11 is not the beginning of history. Nor are the histories of more forgotten places and people, the events that shape those histories, less terrible and violent – though they may often be less spectacular. The singularity of this violence, this paradigm of terror, does not even simply lie in its globality, for that is something that our century shares with the whole history of capitalism and empire, of which it is a part. Rather, it must be seen in the fact that **terror as a global phenomenon** has now become **self-conscious**. Today, the struggle is for global dominance in a singularly new way, and war –regardless of where it happens—is also **always global**. Moreover, in its self-awareness, terror has become, more than it has ever been, an instrument of racism. Indeed, what is new in the singularity of this violent struggle, this racist and terrifying war, is that in the usual attempt to neutralize the enemy, **there is a cleansing of immense proportion going on**. To use a word which has become popular since Michel Foucault, it is a biopolitical cleansing. This is not the traditional ethnic cleansing, where one ethnic group is targeted by a state power – though that is also part of the general paradigm of racism and violence. It is rather **a global cleansing**, where the sovereign elites, the global sovereigns in the political and financial arenas (capital and the political institutions), in all kinds of ways target those who do not belong with them on account of their race, class, gender, and so on, but above all, **on account of their way of life and way of thinking**. These are the multitudes of people who, for one reason or the other, are **liable for scrutiny and surveillance, extortion** (typically, in the form of over- taxation and fines) and **arrest, brutality, torture, and violent death**. The sovereigns target anyone who, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) shows with the figure of homo sacer, **can be killed without being sacrificed** – anyone who can be reduced to the paradoxical and ultimately impossible condition of bare life, whose only horizon is death itself. In this sense, the biopolitical cleansing is also immediately a thanatopolitical instrument.¶ The biopolitical struggle for dominance is a fight to the death. Those who wage the struggle to begin with, those who want to dominate, will not rest until they have prevailed. Their fanatical and self-serving drive is also very much **the source of the crisis** investing all others. The point of this essay is to show that the present crisis, which is systemic and permanent and thus something more than a mere crisis, **cannot be solved** unless **the struggle for dominance is eliminated**. The elimination of such struggle implies the demise of the global sovereigns, the global elites – and this will not happen without a global revolution, **a “restructuring of the world”** (Fanon 1967: 82). This must be a revolution **against the paradigm of violence** and terror typical of the global sovereigns. It is not a movement that uses violence and terror, but rather one that counters the primordial terror and violence of the sovereign elites by **living up to the vision of a new world** already worked out and cherished by multitudes of people. This is the nature of **counter-violence**: not to use violence in one’s own turn, but **to deactivate and destroy its mechanism**. At the beginning of the modern era, Niccolò Machiavelli saw the main distinction is society in terms of dominance, the will to dominate, or the lack thereof. **Freedom**, Machiavelli says, is obviously on the side of those who reject the paradigm of domination:¶ [A]nd doubtless, if we consider the objects of the nobles and of the people, we must see that the first have a great desire to dominate, whilst the latter have only the wish not to be dominated, and consequently a greater desire to live in the enjoyment of liberty (Discourses, I, V).¶ Who can resist applying this amazing insight to the many situations of resistance and revolt that have been happening in the world for the last two years? From Tahrir Square to Bahrain, from Syntagma Square and Plaza Mayor to the streets of New York and Oakland, ‘**the people’ speak with one voice against ‘the nobles**;’ the 99% all face the same enemy: the same 1%; courage and freedom face the same police and military machine of cowardice and deceit, brutality and repression. Those who do not want to be dominated, and do not need to be governed, are **ontologically on the terrain of freedom**, always-already turned toward a poetic desire for the **common good**, the **ethics of a just world**. The point here is not to distinguish between good and evil, but rather to understand the twofold nature of power – as domination or as care.¶ The biopolitical (and thanatopolitical) struggle for dominance is unilateral, for there is only one side that wants to dominate. The other side –ontologically, if not circumstantially, free and certainly wiser—does not want to dominate; rather, it wants not to be dominated. This means that **it rejects domination as such**. The rejection of domination also implies the rejection of violence, and I have already spoken above of the meaning of counter-violence in this sense. To put it another way, with Melville’s (2012) Bartleby, this other side **“would prefer not to”** be dominated, and it “would prefer not to” be forced into the paradigm of violence. Yet, for this preference, this desire, to pass from potentiality into actuality, **action must be taken** – an action which is a return and **a going under, an uprising and a hurricane**. Revolution is to turn oneself away from the terror and violence of the sovereign elites toward the horizon of freedom and care, which is the pre- existing ontological ground of the difference mentioned by Machiavelli between the nobles and the people, the 1% (to use a terminology different from Machiavelli’s) and the 99%. What is important is that the sovereign elite and its war machine, its police apparatuses, its false sense of the law, **be done with**. It is important that the sovereigns be shown, as Agamben says, in **“their original proximity to the criminal”** (2000: 107) **and that they be dealt with accordingly**. For this to happen, a true sense of the law must be recuperated, one whereby **the law is also immediately ethics**. The sovereigns will be **brought to justice**. The process is long, but it is in many ways already underway. The recent news that a human rights lawyer will lead a UN investigation into the question of drone strikes and other forms of targeted killing (The New York Times, January 24, 2013) is an **indication of the fact that the movement of those who do not want to be dominated is not without effect**. An initiative such as this is perhaps necessarily timid at the outset and it may be sidetracked in many ways by powerful interests in its course. Yet, **even positing**, at that institutional level, **the possibility** that drone strikes be a form of unlawful killing and war crime is a clear indication of what common reason (one is tempted to say, the General Intellect) already understands and knows. The hope of those who **“would prefer not to”** be involved in a violent practice such as this, is that those responsible for it be held accountable and that the horizon of terror be canceled and overcome. Indeed, **the earth needs care**. And when instead of caring for it, resources are dangerously wasted and abused, **it is imperative** that those **who know and understand revolt** –and what they must revolt against is the squandering and irresponible elites, the sovereign discourse, whose authority, beyond all nice rhetoric, ultimately rests on the threat of military violence and police brutality¶

#### The purported sterilized environment could be no further from the truth, and this image serves to hide the detention center’s ongoing violence

Veeren, 11

Elspeth van Veeren, PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex focusing on the production of meaning in world politics through an exploration of the material and visual practices at Joint Task Force Guantánamo; “Captured by the camera’s eye: Guantánamo and the shifting frame of the Global War on Terror,” 11/29/2011, Review of International Studies, Volume 37, pg. 1721-1749 //bghs-ms

After April 2002 and the move from Camp X-Ray to Camp Delta, the representation of Guantánamo changed. While the practices surrounding detention at the US facility remain similar – the short-shackling, blindfolding and the dressing in orange uniforms of new arrivals in particular82 – the frame shifted so that these are no longer visible. Instead, visual representations of Guantánamo are dominated by different images: the orange series has been replaced by a ‘white series’ and an ‘empty cell’ series. Whether this can be understood as a deliberate reframing or not, a shift in the frame has nevertheless occurred following the significant criticisms that were levelled at the Bush administration and the release of the initial images. Replacing the orange series, therefore, are a series of images that re-inscribe the ‘humane’ onto US detention practices. Once again watching the faces and bodies and how they are framed offers a point of reference for reading these images for the constitution of a new reality of detention at Guantánamo.¶ The white series: the new face of detention¶ Within the white series the blacked-out goggles are gone, as are the orange jumpsuits/boilersuits. Instead, detainees most commonly appear dressed in white or tan shirts and trousers, occasionally with a white skull-cap. Though they often remain accompanied by guards, in some images in the series detainees are seen sitting and interacting with one another or playing sports. Instead of images of detainees arriving and being ‘processed’ (at least 14 detainees arrived after the move to Camp Delta, for which there was significant press coverage, including high profile speeches by President Bush), we the viewer ‘outside the wire’ are presented with a different type of photograph.¶ First, the change of uniform reflects the introduction of a new system of categorisations or marking of detainees that occurred at JTF-Guantánamo in 2003. Though some detainees remain dressed in orange – those who are recent arrivals or are being punished and confined in the ‘supermaximum prison’ Camps – the bodies that are most visible appear dressed in white (or tan) and are the bodies of detainees who have the greatest degree of freedom to move around and to interact with other detainees within Camp Delta (particularly those that are classified as ‘compliant’ and are confined in the ‘showcase’ camp, Camp Four). In other words, in this new frame, which privileges representations of Guantánamo as equivalent to Camp Four, bodies are associated with and marked by a new uniform and its associated chain of signification.¶ Second, in some images we are permitted to see detainees ‘at play’, either sitting conversing with one another, eating, praying, or playing with a ball in an exercise yard. Whereas in Camp X-Ray and the orange series detainees were most often represented as severely restricted in their ability to move and passive, the white series depicts bodies being moved and moving with more freedom: when accompanied by guards detainees’ feet may appear unshackled and, when on their own, detainees movements are seemingly uninhibited.83 The wires, gates and watchtowers nevertheless remain within these frames, as the threat nevertheless remains and must be contained.¶ Turning from the body to the ‘face’ of detainees in the white series, not only have orange bodies been banished, but the faces of detainees have also been removed from this new frame. Detainees remain effaced, but the manner of this effacement has changed significantly. Masks, goggles or hunched shoulders are no longer used to hide their faces. Instead, detainees are effaced principally through the cropping of photographs and through the use of images in which they are not photographed from the front.84 The images of Guantánamo detainees that have been released and appear in the press are those where detainees’ heads have been literally cut out of the image – they have been figuratively decapitated by the frame of the photo. This framing accomplishes several things. First, it allows the US administration to continue to claim that it is acting in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions by not permitting images of individually recognisable detainees to leave Guantánamo, therefore (re)presenting their policies towards detainees as humane. The change in frame permits the US authorities to (re-)inscribe their respect for the ‘spirit of Geneva’ by limiting the possibility of individually identifying detainees. Second, this cropping, as opposed to covering up of faces, means that the possibility of a connection with a face is again reduced. Though ‘a face’ may be seen in the bodies of these men as they appear in the images (as Alex Danchev would argue interpreting Levinas),85 the face that is not seen is left to the imagination to devise, encouraging a different relationship between the viewer and the subject. Though this effacement may be done in the name of ‘humane treatment’ and ‘in the spirit of Geneva’, it succeeds again in stripping detainees of an important part of the connection between the viewer and the subject in these images – their ability to return a gaze. Third, the remnant of the face that is occasionally left is most often the chin, which is often bearded. For American audiences, this bearded face may also help to reinforce the association between these bodies and terrorism, as the beard in American culture has historically been articulated as a symbol of wildness and barbarity, as with Cuba’s Castro or the bearded ‘TV Arab’ of Hollywood.86 And finally, these images continue to allow the US to identify specific bodies as ‘terrorists’; to use these men as embodied signs of punishment and justice. The presence of men at the camp, like in the orange series, provides the US administration with a way of visually demonstrating the existence of terrorists, their capture and incarceration, and the US’ continued determination to bring them to justice, while (re)producing their treatment in Camp Delta as ‘humane’.

#### This year’s resolution presents us with the question of increasing economic engagement toward Cuba. We respond with another question: “What of the Guantanamo detainees”? Guantanamo has historically been a centerpiece of US economic policy toward Cuba, and we believe criticism of the effects current policy has on Guantanamo detainees is a prerequisite to further engagement

Ree, 12

Patrick Ree, student of Arts (BA), Art History, Criticism and Conservation at Rutgers University; “Locating in Obscurity: Cuba and Guantánamo Bay,” 4/19/2012, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/04/19/locating-in-obscurity-cuba-and-guantanamo-bay //bghs-ms

The geography of Guantánamo has always involved a contested race for authority, due to its centrality in the Western hemisphere as a gateway for economic opportunity and political authority. On his second voyage in 1494, Christopher Columbus discovered Guantánamo Bay on the southeastern coast of Cuba — a natural harbor with a wide mouth lying low to the ocean and surrounded by a mountain range. From here Columbus encountered Cuba’s natural fecundity: an island that was capable of producing valuable resources such as silver, tobacco, coffee, and sugar. These natural resources (particularly sugar) would ensure Spain’s political dominance over global trade in the Atlantic World, and effectually define the Cuban landscape as an integral economic resource for future colonial enterprises.¶ Beyond the bay, Columbus familiarized himself with the complex network of trade winds that centralized Guantánamo Bay within the larger Caribbean Basin. Between Guantánamo Bay and the northwest end of Hispaniola lies one of the busiest sea-lanes in the Western hemisphere—the Windward Passage. Its winds blow ships from the Atlantic into the Caribbean Basin where travelers have total access to the Antilles Islands, the Gulf of Mexico, Central and South America, and – by the twentieth century – even the Pacific Ocean by way of the Panama Canal. This oceanic system effectively unites the global hemispheres, making it ideal for boundless human movement, colonial expansion, and commercial enterprise. Thus, the ecologically complex, secure, and ripe landscape of Guantánamo Bay was an attractive resource for Spanish colonial expansion in the Caribbean Basin, inciting a familiar history of imperial exploitation of commerce in the modern Atlantic World. In the late nineteenth century, the United States sought to use Guantánamo Bay as a strategic location to counter the remnants of Spanish colonial rule in the Western Hemisphere. After the outbreak of the Spanish-American War of 1898, U.S. naval forces deployed in the Bay. At the battle of Guantánamo Bay from June 6-10, 1898, U.S. and Cuban troops defeated Spanish forces. The War threw Spain off the seat of world power, and lifted the U.S. to the forefront of global democracy and power. However, the U.S. narrative within Cuba’s independence was also part of a broader imperial program. While encouraging democracy in Cuba, the Cuban-American Treaty of 1903 (coinciding with the Platt Amendment of 1901) transformed Guantánamo Bay into space that produced Cuban sovereignty, but remained under U.S. military jurisdiction. Thus, despite recognizing Cuban independence, U.S. political authority over Guantánamo Naval Base (GTMO) reaffirmed its continued control of a region that had been historically paramount to colonialist strategies, further undermining Cuba’s ability to self-govern.¶ It is important to mark this event as a shift from the colonial mapping of Guantánamo Bay to the neocolonialist GTMO’s mapping and present day detention camp. This functional change in the region would absorb the consequences of 20th and 21st century foreign affairs, ranging from the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the detention of Haitian refugees during the 1990s, and recent War on Terror detainees. All things considered, the naval base has incited ongoing consternation over an unrecognized diplomatic basis for continued U.S. presence in Guantánamo Bay since the Cuban-American treaty of 1903. With this exceptional status, the base serves U.S. foreign affairs, but not Cuba’s. Thus, with the establishment of U.S. political authority in GTMO, the acknowledgement of Cuba as an independent sovereign state has always remained in question.¶ Today, the base remains an entangled balancing act of political and national control. But with the recent international focus on 21st century detentions, new obscurities arise from questions over human rights violations and democracy. Does Guantánamo Bay’s exceptional legal status justify the use of the naval base as a detention camp? How many times has the base been “closed,” and what does closure ultimately mean for those who viewed the naval base as important versus those who have been “freed?” These are among the many questions that expose the need for a closer interpretation of the allure of the Cuban landscape, and what makes U.S. control over Guantánamo Bay still vital today. With the changing contexts of Guantánamo’s centrality in world focus, it is important to view the Cuban landscape as a continued narrative of imperial expansion that is evolving with new meanings of global political economy.

#### Our advocacy is one that seeks to expose the hidden flaws in current US-Cuba policy. The performance of the 1AC is the performance the sovereign intended you not to see – we are a starting point for the reversal of the Guantanamo Bay simulacrum

Veeren, 12

Elspeth van Veeren, PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex focusing on the production of meaning in world politics through an exploration of the material and visual practices at Joint Task Force Guantánamo; “Clean War, Invisible War, Liberal War: The Clean and Dirty Politics of Guantánamo,” 3/19/2002 //bghs-ms

On top of this, many activists outside the wire engaged in public protests against Guantánamo, most notably by dressing in orange jumpsuits and performing Guantánamo. Despite the evolution of the site, and the efforts of the administration to distance itself from the Camp X-Ray representation and therefore ‘clean’ it, performances of the Guantánamo Icon enabled activists to continually remind viewers of its violence. Consequently, in the ten years since the initial images of the US military detention facilities at Guantánamo were released, an impressive range of street theatre and artistic interventions has emerged as part of collective worldwide protests against US detention and interrogation practices, including mass protests outside embassies of silent figures dressed in orange, dance performances, ceramic figurines, art installations, guerrilla art, films and theatre where the orange suit literally takes centre stage. To perform Guantánamo is to render visible ‘the experience of torture and incarceration and to expose its brutality’.65¶ These performances and interventions therefore helped to contest the official construction of Guantánamo, transforming its meaning and producing instead a common sense in which military detention, the military and the US state were ‘dirty’. The image of the orange-clad Guantánamo detainee became visual shorthand, a visual metaphor, for a tortured rather than a terrorist subject position, and through its iconic status became a central feature of a discourse that sought to delegitimize Guantánamo and the Bush administration. To opponents of Guantánamo, mostly abroad, as indicated by the multiple ways in which this figure has appeared, US military detention continues to mean Guantánamo and Guantánamo¶ continues to mean Camp X-Ray and its dirty practices.

#### Our discussion is valuable

Debrix and Lacy, 10

Francois Debrix, bilingual scholar whose research focuses on critical world order studies and the theory of transnational politics and director of interdisciplinary Ph.D. program at Virginia Tech, AND Dr. Mark Lacy, Lecturer, Associate Director: Security Lancaster; “The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy,” 9/30/2010, pg. 81-83 //bghs-ms

But forgetting often trumps remembering. When the Tipton Three were about¶ to be released from Guantanamo in response to considerable international pressure¶ affirming their innocence, they were not given any sort of apology or compensation.¶ Instead, they were taken to a special place nicknamed the “Love Shack" where they¶ were unshackled and allowed to munch on Pizza Hut pizzas, McDonald`s burgers, and¶ Pringles chips while watching DVDs. “This was because they knew they had messed us¶ about and tortured us for two and a half years, and they hoped we would forget it,"¶ speculated Asif Iqbal.¶ 53¶ There are indications that such a Guantanamo-Pringles effect may be at work in American daily life too. Journalist Thomas L. Friedman charges that Americans are¶ forgetting about Iraq because of fatigue over the failure of the so-called “surge” (the¶ extra 20,000 troops Bush ordered to Iraq in 2007) and because of the inability of the¶ Democrats to bring about any troop withdrawal.54 Many have bemoaned America’s lack of an anti-war movement, and to the extent that there has been one, its key¶ figure, Cindy Sheehan, resigned from it in exhaustion.55 “Iraq fatigue” became a¶ commonplace expression by 2008.¶ But the recent debate over torture also forgets that the American use of it did¶ not begin in late 2001 or in 2002, in Afghanistan or at Guantanamo. Democracies,¶ including the United States, have used torture at least since the nineteenth century,¶ even though torture (that is to say, “intimidation, abuse of public trust, extraction¶ of false confessions [and] the blind eye of officials") is clearly antithetical to the idea¶ of democracy. What gradually has changed though, according to Darius Rejali, is¶ the introduction of a “clean torture” that leaves few marks on the body and happens¶ behind closed doors. This is the very kind of torture that is conveniently and easily¶ forgotten.56 Methods of “clean torture" have long been exported to other regimes,¶ and taught to Latin American leaders who graduated from the notorious CIA-funded¶ School of the Americas (now located at Fort Benning, Georgia). Naomi Klein argues¶ that it is strange that Americans say “Never before!" when it comes to US torture¶ when, really, they should be protesting “Never again!" What is really different today is¶ not the use of torture but, as Zizek suggests, its emergence from the shadows and its¶ public legitimization.57¶ Jack Bauer's real-time torture frenzy to "save lives,” even if it means hurting¶ others, also forgets the real-life detonation of the bombs that already were said to¶ have “saved lives” on August 6 and 9, 1945. Historian Herbert P. Bix reveals that the¶ Truman administration’s decision to drop the nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and¶ Nagasaki in 1945, presented for decades as necessary to save lives, won public support¶ through careful cultivation of the myth of "good intentions.” American nuclear¶ bombs, together with other conventional bombs dropped over Japan, killed between¶ 600,000 and 900,000 Japanese noncombatants. These overwhelming civilian casualties¶ could be made conscionable to do-good Americans only through the careful use of governmental rhetoric highlighting the special conditions of battle, the righteousness¶ of the mission, and the good intentions of the leaders and soldiers. “What counted¶ was the motive,” explains Bix, “not the consequences of the act or the nature of the¶ weapons used.”58 “Collateral damage” became a euphemism to hide the killing of civilians in the nuclear age and to exempt the United States from any moral or legal¶ accountability for those acts. As Bix puts it, "it is the military’s way of saying: judge the¶ commander, the pilot, the combat soldier, even the U S mercenary and torturer not¶ by what he did but by his subjective state of mind when he did it."59¶ The sudden public/'popular cultural interest in twenty-first-century American¶ torture cannot only be explained asa hangover from the 1945 nuclear bombs, French¶ colonialism in Algeria, or mindless television, although all these things do matter.¶ The tact that people comply easily with authority – a compliance that might devolve¶ into accepting the abuse, torture, and murder of civilians – is conditioned by what¶ Michel Foucault identified as the “trace of torture" found in the practices of everyday life. What Foucault had in mind was life as managed by the “great enclosed, complex¶ and hierarchized structure," or “the body of the state."60 According to Foucault,¶ feudal societies once used the spectacle of torture to repress criminals. But by the¶ nineteenth century, the punishments became more private than public, more hidden¶ than carnivalesque, more about the suspension of rights than about leaving marks on¶ the body, and more about tedious investigations and classifications than about open¶ confrontations between torturers and criminals. Modern societies that organize,¶ regulate, classify, and impose norms and rules that turn entire populations (and not¶ just prisoners from afar) into passive objects of authority, carry over this trace of torture¶ into the daily lives of those they administer, in schools, clinics, and other agencies/¶ institutions of everyday social welfare.¶ 61 This docility alone is “useful," and it becomes more easily obtained as the education policies threaten to turn schools into endless examination-cramming and data-displaying centers. One might wonder, then, if this conversion of complex social¶ history into data crunching and immutable discourse is not enough in itself to satisfy¶ educational goals for authoritarian leaders. But there are still other educational¶ “benefits” that can be obtained from the re-normalizing of torture in public policy and life. Foucault’s social histories show that the crowds that gathered around the¶ scaffolds gave their hearty enthusiasm to the veritable political ritual, joining in the¶ triumph of the executioner’s liturgical punishment. Since a docile population is¶ not a lively population, then, with the return of torture from the shadows into TV’s¶ primetime comes the possibility of a bolder and more enthusiastic endorsement of¶ the sovereign. One can refer, once again, to the certainty of pro-Jack Bauer conservative pundits like Buchanan (and many others) who happily endorse a strong leader¶ who will do “whatever it takes” to get the job done. But Rejali warns that “it would be¶ ignoring history to assume that what happens in an American-run prison in Iraq will¶ stay in Iraq.” Rejali adds: “Soldiers who learn torture techniques abroad get jobs as¶ police officers when they return, and the new developments in torture you read about¶ today could yet be employed in a neighborhood near you.”62 Educational messages in¶ schools or in TV programs that instill the resurrected enthusiasm of scaffold spectators will create a nation of better Jack Bauers. *But*, as Rejali intimates, there is always a¶ glitch. As Foucault’s feudal lords discovered, enthusiastic crowds can end up turning¶ against their sovereign leader, sympathizing with prisoners, and arguing for more¶ rights.¶ Against such a possibility, strategies of language contort the meaning of torture¶ in order to redesign allegiance to the owner of the scaffold and perform the illusion¶ of international compliance. High profile American legal scholar Alan Dershowitz¶ proclaims: “I am against torture. But if we do it, we must do it democratically.” Newly¶ appointed Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey chimes in: “Torture is ‘repugnant,’ but I am not sure if it is illegal." And Bush confirms: “Torture means organ failure.¶ Therefore, the United States does not torture." Such utterances are not conducive¶ to producing the kind of constructive ambiguity tl1at could build bridges and enable¶ more fluidity across borders. Rather, these statements are classic instances of Orwellian¶ doublespeak-hiding one meaning while proclaiming another-securing the totality of American imperialism.¶ Conclusion¶ Such an American geopolitical and imperialistic totality was initiated in the “with us¶ or with the terrorists" rhetorical launch of the war on terror. It has also been bolstered¶ by the unitary effects of mind-numbing visual spectacles, tabloid geopolitics, and pop¶ cultural verisimilitudes. In the not-so-distant past, it could be reasonably assumed¶ that nations were interested in protecting the unitary' purposes of war in national¶ memories. This is especially the case for the victorious. With the American loss in¶ Vietnam, other narratives of affirmation-the American victory in the Cold War, the¶ show of democracy in the concurrent civil rights movement, the collective admission¶ of shame in the Film oeuvres-could partly contain the shame of defeat.¶ In the synchronic rather than diachronic space between the global war on terror¶ and an imagined final-answer textbook, concerned citizens have pushed for more informed debate on torture in America. The 10 visual popular culture works described¶ in this chapter hope to intervene on behalf of the public sphere, in the interest of¶ an open national narrative, before such a narrative becomes too linear and reaches¶ a predictable conclusion. These alternative sites present viewers with complex and¶ moving stories and perspectives connected to a range of useful information sources.¶ Even those works that are marked “for teachers" do not underestimate the capacity of¶ citizens (or students) to process raw or complex issues (that have to do with a conflict¶ that has not vet ended) so that the power of visual intelligence can be reclaimed and¶ a culture that tries to normalize torture can he refused.¶ Without interference from a demanding and critical public, the Abu Ghraib¶ photos, for example, are in danger of being reduced to the dim memory of some "bad¶ apples” doing disturbing things on a night shift. And a textbook paragraph on this¶ event may end up sounding very much like the spin that Cheney gave to it in 2007,¶ already seeking to create the impression of a faraway past. Indeed, Cheney declared:¶ "Some years ago, when abuses were committed at Abu Ghraib prison-again, a facility¶ that had nothing to do with the detainee program run by the CIA-the abuses that.¶ came to light rightfully outraged many people. The wrongdoers were arrested and¶ prosecuted, and justice was demanded.¶ 63¶

#### The 1AC is a resistant reading of the images of the Guantanamo detainees’ suffering. Vote aff to reclaim the field of representation – we should move away from the “safe and humane” simulacrum of Gitmo circulated by the USFG and toward the exposition of the torture victims’ anguish. This reinterpretation is key to mobilize successful anti-Guantanamo resistance

Veeren, 11

Elspeth van Veeren, PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex focusing on the production of meaning in world politics through an exploration of the material and visual practices at Joint Task Force Guantánamo; “Captured by the camera’s eye: Guantánamo and the shifting frame of the Global War on Terror,” 11/29/2011, Review of International Studies, Volume 37, pg. 1721-1749 //bghs-ms

Despite the short space of time (or time frame) during which the orange series was produced, and despite the fact that Guantánamo has evolved considerably from those early days, the orange series continues to ‘haunt’ us. The series is reproduced and circulated widely on the Internet and in the press. The power of these images, their ability to capture, communicate and reduce a complex series of meanings, has led to their status as iconic images of the GWoT. Their iconic status may in part be due to the possibility that these images can be read a number of ways; they come to represent different meanings to different people depending on a viewer’s pre-existing perspective and the narrative to which they subscribe regarding the GWoT. As Susan Sontag reminds us, echoing Jacques Derrida but with specific regard to photographs, interpretation is always contested, never closed. Alter the caption and a photo may be used, reused and (re)produced with a different meaning: the well-know image ‘Migrant Mother’ by Dorothea Lange has come to mean the best and the worst of Depression-era US government policies but was later rearticulated to represent the horrors of the Spanish Civil War as well as the politics of the Black Panthers; the raising of the US flag at Surabachi, an icon of American patriotism, has been (re)used in publicity for jeans and to protest for peace; and the portrait of Che Guevara which has accompanied many a revolutionary or anti-war protest has also been used to sell T-shirts.75 Even ‘photographs of an atrocity may give rise to opposing responses’.76 As Sontag explains, the same photograph of children killed by shelling during the Bosnian war was used by both Serbs and Croats as evidence of atrocities committed by the other side.77¶ The images of Guantánamo reflect this contingency. As a result, both readings consistent with the official discourse and *resistant readings* are possible. The orange series has been so widely used and circulated in part because the images can be read in so many ways. Despite all the power exerted by the administration with regards to Guantánamo and the GWoT, the highly contingent nature of identities, and the contingent nature of the representations of these identities, suggest that efforts to fix detainee, as well as guard, identities through these images failed. Torie Claire perhaps should not have been as surprised as she was with the reception to the images: ‘Did I ever misread what was in those photos’, Clarke wrote. ‘The problem wasn’t that we released too much, it was that we explained too little [. . .] which allowed other critics to say we were forcing the detainees into poses of subjugation.’78 Clarke underestimated or overlooked the difficulties, or impossibilities, of fixing a meaning to these images.¶ In particular, elements of these images can and have been successfully rearticulated within the discourse of anti-Guantánamo campaigns to transform detainee identities in the orange series from ‘terrorist’ to ‘torture victim’. This was accomplished both through the appropriation of these Department of Defense¶ images by the resistance movement for their own campaigns, as well as the production of new images, most importantly images of protesters dressed as Guantánamo detainees (‘performing’ Guantánamo), which draw on the same elements in order to oppose US detention policies and practices. Whether reused or (re)produced, the orange series of Guantánamo images have contributed significantly to the contest over what Guantánamo means. While images alone cannot drive change, as argued by Berger and Perlmutter, the images of Guantánamo resulted in the constitution of a new ‘icon of outrage’80 that has been used successfully to mobilise an anti-Guantánamo campaign that, if it has not resulted in the closure of Guantánamo, has contributed significantly to its scaling back from 660 and a potential of 2,000 detainees to the 174 it holds as of October 2010 by helping to keep the issue in the public eye.81 This sustained appropriation and rearticulation of the images by protestors forced a reframing of detention practices by the US military.

#### The methodology of this round is key --- as citizen-subjects, we are all instrumental to the continuation of the War on Terror

Tagma, 9

Halit Mustafa Tagma, School of Politics and Global Studies, Department of Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ; “Homo Sacer vs. Homo Soccer Mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the War on Terror,” Alternatives 34, Oct.-Dec. 2009, pg. 407-435 //bghs-ms

Despite the secrecy and security, the prisoners of Guántanamo Bay have attracted much attention. The more tragic cases of the “war on terror” are not to be found in such prison camps, rather they are to be found in the remote villages of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We may read about them in the unnoticed article every other week that reports of a drone attack “collaterally damaging” yet another sixty or seventy bodies in remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such deadly airstrikes have also targeted Somalian villages suspected of harboring a few terrorists.38 Rarely is the morality of killing scores of innocent people to “get a few bad guys” questioned. More recently, on 4 September 2009, a German commander in the Kunduz province of Afghanistan called in an airstrike on two fuel tankers that were stolen by the Taliban. The immobilized tankers were surrounded by approximately one hundred Afghani villagers trying to get free fuel. When an F-15 jet dropped two 500-pound bombs, the crowd was immediately incinerated.39 Since the inception of the “war on terror” such news has become a weekly standard, meanwhile citizen-subjects look the other way under the assumption that they must have been bad guys. Still no inquiry has been made into the annihilation of (what is widely argued by locals to be) a remote Pakistani school and the school children in it by a Pakistani/US helicopter raid in 2006.40 What is important to keep in mind for our theoretical purposes is that such violence is not only perpetrated by those who pull a trigger or push a button. Instead, it has a background: actions, decisions, discourses, and practices conducted at the micro level by citizen-subjects. It is these citizen-subjects that state violence is carried out in the name of, and it is their bodies and wealth that is mobilized and put in danger to fight an enemy. It is this form of subjectivity that sovereign power capitalizes on when they conduct killings in remote places.41¶ My point here is that sovereign violence needs and capitalizes on sovereign subjects in order to produce deadly effects. The killing and violence itself may be conducted and administered by bureaucrats, but it requires citizen-subjects to mobilize the will and resources necessary for the sovereign violence.42 With apologies to Edmund Burke, his popular quotation could be rephrased as: All it takes for sovereign violence to kill is the citizen-subject to either applaud or enlist. Sovereign violence capitalizes on the fascistic desire found in the docile bodies of modernity: “For us to survive, those folks far away must die.” Of course, “those folks far away” have historically often been the colonial subjects of Europe. Where today smart bombs kill civilians in remote villages, colonial attempts to discipline natives included aerial bombardments of remote villages in faraway lands. In 1920, Winston Churchill, as British secretary of war, wrote a memo on the uncontrollable villages in Northern Iraq: “I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum.”43 Consistently, sovereign violence has been particularly brutal toward “inferior far away people.”

## 2AC

### Case

#### The detainees knew their poems would be censored so they coded them so they would not be legible to the sovereign

CHIROT 11David Baptiste Chirot is a litterateur, artist, reader and critic.. Since 1997, Chirot has contributed essays, visual & sound poetry, performance scores, prose poetry, poetry and book reviews in 70+ different print and online journals in USA, Brazil, England, Spain, France, Germany, Russia, Chile, Australia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Cuba, Turkey, Japan, Holland, Belgium, Uruguay and India.

Isolation is the condition from which and into which the Guantanamo poets and poems emerge and become re-confined. The book of poems is treated as an "isolated" event, outside of the forms of critique and reading that constitute a "normalized" poetry's "reception." The circumstances of the poets, the Pentagon supervision of censorships, legal translators, "stand in the way" of the poems finding a context in which to be read as more than one more addition to the shelves of "prison poetry." "Put off to the side," it is hoped they may quickly "go unread" rather than participate in a questioning of the War on Terror and American language and writing's responses—or lack of them—to the Global conflict. ¶ The poems, however, are not "an isolated event" at all, but integrally "bound" to the ongoing contexts of the Invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and the unbounded Global War on Terror. Their language needs to be read in relation with the writing which was and is used in the construction and maintenance of the GWAT and Homeland Security. This is a language "already written" and at the same time as yet unrecognized as an American writing, one by which an isolated and isolationist America paradoxically becomes part of a world it "crusades" to have no part of. By examining this unrecognized language in terms of its various manifestations as both "documents" and "fictions," what emerges is a "New" Extreme American Poetry of which the Guantanamo Poems are very much a part.¶ "'As usual,' says Pasolini, 'the only symptoms we had to go on were in the language.'" In The Moro Affair, Leonardo Sciascia makes use of Pasolini's example in examining the texts generated by the 1978 kidnapping and execution by the Red Brigades of the Italian premier Aldo Moro. By examining the language of Moro's letters, Sciascia "develops," as from a negative, the realization by Moro of the full "exposure" of Power "hidden in plain sight." Paradoxically hidden in plain sight, for Moro himself is hidden in plain sight, both physically, and through his uses of language, in which he essays to "reveal his location" and his desire to be freed through an exchange for Leftist Prisoners.¶ Inevitably, the longer his words seem to remain obscure, the more they show themselves becoming aware that those looking for him are only going through the motions. It is not the Red Brigade which wants his execution, but his own Party, his own friends. At first writing from a presumed position of solidarity, Moro's language finds its way to his true condition, that of isolation:¶ He was obliged to express himself in a language of non-expression, to make himself understood by the same means he had sought and tested to in order not to be understood. He had to communicate through the language of non-communication. Out of necessity. That is through censorship and self-censorship. As a prisoner. As a spy in enemy territory and under enemy supervision.¶ With the Guantanamo Poems, as Flagg Miller suggests in his excellent preface, it is not only censorship which is involved, **but a self-censorship on the part of the poets**. While the military plays its part as censor, the poets "of necessity" are forced to counter with a self-censorship which may make it possible "**to communicate through the language of non-communication**" which may pass the censor. Seeking to expunge every sign of "poetry" as carrying a perhaps concealed message, the censors force the detainees to choose "non-poetry" which communicates the existence of a "real poetry" which is not allowed to show itself. As Sciascia notes: ". . . obliged to express himself in a language of non-expression," the poet must "make himself understood by the same means he had sought and tested in order not to be understood."¶ The great majority of reviewers, even when sympathetic to the plight of the poets, express the finding that the "poems" are not "poetry." Even giving the poets a "break" for writing in traditions foreign to Americans, and their being translated by non-literary translators, most critics agree there is "no poetry here." For a number of these critics, the "real poet" responsible for this non-poetry is the Pentagon. This in effect, cancels out the meaning of the poems' publication. Ultimately, it may be –and has been--regarded as a "protest" not to even read the poems.¶ Sciascia's reading of Moro's letters suggests however that the very existence of poetry is possible in the poems' language of non-poetry. This is because the poet is forced to write a "language of non-expression," (a non-poetry), in order to "make himself understood by the same means he had sought and tested in order not to be understood."¶ The words "sought and tested" indicate that a language has been chosen through "experiment" and "experience" for its effectiveness as a "non-expression" "in order not to be understood." Consider the poets' situation in its relationship to censorship. The isolation, torture and strict control of every aspect of the detainees' existence and language is not meant to "silence" them, but to FORCE THEM TO SPEAK. If one is being forced to speak, the **sole means of resistance is to speak so as not to be understood, to communicate via "non-expression.**" ¶ Forced to speak, the detainee seems to the torturers, guards and Pentagon supervisors, to be doing exactly what is demanded of him. Yet, forced to speak, **the detainee must find a way to do so without being" understood**," and at the same time produce a "non-expression" which is on the surface "acceptable" and "understood" by the torturers

#### **Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end**

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### 2AC DA

#### The War on Terror is an epic fail in every sense of the term – we have stats

Evans, 12

Becky Evans, Associated Press reporter; “Has the War on Terror failed? Number of terrorist attacks QUADRUPLE in decade after 9/11,” 12/4/2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2242803/Has-War-Terror-failed-Number-terrorist-attacks-QUADRUPLE-decade-9-11.html //bghs-ms

The number of terrorist attacks each year has more than quadrupled in the decade since 9/11, according to a study launched today. ¶ The Global Terrorist Index showed that in 2002 there were 982 separate attacks. By 2011 that had risen to 4,564.¶ Researchers suggest the U.S. military interventions pursued as part of the West's anti-al Qaeda 'war on terror' may have made terrorism worse.¶ It also said it was impossible to prove whether the policy made the U.S homeland safer.¶ Despite the increase in attacks in the past ten years, the number of deaths in terrorists attacks has fallen. ¶ It peaked in 2007 at the height of the Iraq war when 10,009 people died. That figure had fallen to 7,473 last year. ¶ Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Yemen have been the most affected by terrorism in the past ten years.¶ The rankings were based on the number of attacks, fatalities, injuries and the level of property damage caused in each country through terrorist attacks. ¶ Steve Killelea, founder and executive chairman of the Institute for Economics and Peace, which published the report, said: 'After 9/11, terrorist activity fell back to pre-2000 levels until after the Iraq invasion, and has since escalated dramatically.¶ 'Iraq accounts for about a third of all terrorist deaths over the last decade, and Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan account for over 50 percent of fatalities.'¶ In the decade since 9/11, fatalities from terrorist attacks have increased by 195%, incidents by 460% and injuries by 224%.¶ The upswing in attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan only occurred after the Iraq war, coinciding with heightened U.S-backed military campaigns by NATO and the Pakistani government respectively, the report said. ¶ The findings suggested foreign powers should think twice before intervening militarily, Mr Killelea said, even in countries such as Syria, which is already seeing widespread bloodshed.¶ Unless the conflict was brought to a swift end, terror attacks might actually increase**,** he said.¶ The index is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database run by the University of Maryland. ¶ It said the greatest deterioration in 2011 took place in Syria and Yemen.¶ Yemen has seen a dramatic upsurge in al Qaeda-linked activity in recent years, while Syrian rebels fighting President Bashar al-Assad have increasingly turned to suicide attacks and bombings.¶ Of the 158 countries surveyed, only 31 had not experienced a single event classified as a 'terrorist act' since 2001.¶ These included Brazil, Croatia, Ghana, Jamaica and Poland.

#### Invoking the terrorist threat is counterproductive

Jackson 9 (Richard Jackson is Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV). He is the founding editor of the journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and the author of Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism (2005). “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of politsical terrorism” in *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, Routledge)

As explained earlier, a ﬁrst order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientiﬁc modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead sufﬁce to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives. In the ﬁrst instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial deﬁnition within the ﬁeld and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002). The assumption that terrorism can be objectively deﬁned and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identiﬁed in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the ﬁrst instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identiﬁable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security ofﬁcials, and the codiﬁcation of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the deﬁnitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies ﬁeld. Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (

see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004). More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, speciﬁcally, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key ﬁndings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s ﬁndings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005). Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efﬁcacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006). In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the ﬁeld, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the ﬁrst order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and ﬁnal ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, ﬁrst order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the ﬁeld, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

**Indefinite detention increases terrorism—multiple mechanisms**

Martin **Scheinin**, Professor, International Law, “Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?” REAL CLEAR WORLD, interviewed by Casey L. Coombs, 1—11—**12**, [www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national\_defense\_authorization\_act\_scheinin\_interview-full.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national_defense_authorization_act_scheinin_interview-full.html), accessed 8-21-13.

CLC: As a world leader and active promoter of universal human rights, the practice of indefinite detention without charge would seem to clash with U.S. ideals. Could you comment on this contradiction? MS: One of the main lessons learned in the international fight against terrorism is that counter-terrorism professionals have gradually come to learn and admit that human rights violations are not an acceptable shortcut in an effective fight against terrorism. Such measures tend to backfire in multiple ways. They result in legal problems by hampering prosecution, trial and punishment. The use of torture is a clear example here. They also tend to alienate the communities with which authorities should be working in order to detect and prevent terrorism. And they add to causes of terrorism, both by perpetuating "root causes" that involve the alienation of communities and by providing "triggering causes" through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism. The NDAA is just one more step in the wrong direction, by aggravating the counterproductive effects of human rights violating measures put in place in the name of countering terrorism. CLC: Does the NDAA afford the U.S. a practical advantage in the fight against terrorism? Or might the law undermine its global credibility? MS: It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being "tough" or as "doing something." The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism. By constraining the choices by the executive, it nevertheless hampers effective counter-terrorism work, including criminal investigation and prosecution, as well as international counter-terrorism cooperation, markedly in the issue of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hence, it carries the risk of distancing the United States from its closest allies and the international community generally. And of course these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion.

Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

### 2AC FW

#### Their focus on textual hegemony must be rejected a priori as an instrument of Western imperialism – do not concern yourself with legibility

Conquergood, 2

Dwight Conquergood, Performance studies Interventions and Radial Research, The Drama Review Summer 2002, New York University and the Massachusetts Institution of Technology RW

Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulatory powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders—what de Certeau calls “intextuation”: “Every power, including the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects” (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the “undocumented” immigrants, the so-called “illegal aliens,” known in the vernacular as the people “sin papeles,” the people without papers, indocumentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble “the writing machine of the law” (de Certeau 1984:141). …………..The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcription is not a transparent or politically innocent model for conceptualizing or engaging the world. The root metaphor of the text underpins the supremacy of Western knowledge systems by erasing the vast realm of human knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered, “a history of the tacit and the habitual” (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean Comaroff pay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors “both verbally and nonverbally” (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and struggle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comaroffs intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where “text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all” (1992:26). “In this day and age,” they ask, “do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage cannot speak at all? Or, under greater or lesser duress, opt not to do so” (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### “Resolved” means to reduce through mental analysis

Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 6

(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

#### And “should” means you look to method of advocacy

New Oxford American Dictionary

Should:¶ Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions

**Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas**

Bond and Paterson 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, **economic engagement merits** separate and **detailed analysis**. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

#### Truth and predictability are nihilistic illusions – vote aff to embrace flux

**Lotringer, 1** – Professor of Foreign Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, (Sylvere, “The Dance of Signs” in Hatred of Capitalism: A Semiotext(e) Reader ed. Kraus&Lotringer, Los Angeles:Semiotext(e), pg 174-176)

Freud is not blind to this: "The producer which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far reaching similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with the analytical method which consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill" (Standard Edition, IX, 88). Such is the powerful thrust of similitude. Freud has no more qualms to reduce "poetic creations" to real persons or the "Pompeian fancy" to a simple "psychiatric study." Beneath the trappings of truth, on the razor's edge of demonstration, forces are confronting each other in order to turn the process - the text -into a product. If Gradiva adheres so perfectly to the analytical mold, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof, in Freud's words, of the theory of the unconscious. Absolute proof - or absolute counter-proof... Even thought "absolute" is clearly too strong a word for such a circum-scribed operation, to counter Freud's interpretation and thus unsettle he theory of the unconscious is indeed the substance of the present attempt. Not to replace Freud's elaborate construct with another, more powerful, mode of evaluation would certainly prove the wisdom in the face of the illusion of truth. Although "nihilistic" at heart, such a perspective is not bound to be simply negative. It can attest to a growing force. I realize that I can overcome the temptation of total interpretations, whose values are universal (they are actually symptoms of fear and apathy). To destroy the belief in the law, to dissipate the fiction of predictability, to reject the sage recurrence of the "same," this is not just a "critical" stand. It is an act of force. But destruction must not open onto an absence of values, worthless or meaninglessness. It must lead to a new evaluation. Nietzsche sees in the wisdom of the East a principle of decadence, a weakening of the power of appropriation. Force of intention matters more than will to truth. To reject truth without intensifying the force of invention still participates in the ascetic ideal, thus in ressentiment. "To read off a text without interposing an interpretation" therefore is "hardly possible" (The Will to Power, 479). I must use my creative forces to create values without falling into the inertia of truth or an anemia of will. I must render the text, and the world, to their "disturbing and enigmatic character"; will them incomprehensible, elusive, "in flux," only indebted to perspective valuations: "The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (WP, 655). Inner decay: to dance away over oneself. Motion, not emotions. Freud's interpretation resists the false neutrality of science. It only shows a sign of decline when it aims for the truth, when it succumbs to the temptation of unity, the sick security of monism, the illusion of a reconciliation. A reactive interpretation, it assumes powerful, but fabricated, weapons: the difference between objects and subjects, cause and effect, means and ends, etc. That Gradiva presents a certain order of succession in no way proves that individual moments are related to one another as cause and effect, that they obey a "law" and a calculus but rather that different factions abruptly confront each other in their attempt to draw their ultimate consequence at every moment. "As long as there is a structure, as long as there is a method, or better yet as long as structure and method exist through the mental, through intelligence, time is trapped - or else we imagine we have trapped it" (John Cage, Pour les Oiseaux. Belfond, 1976, 34). Structural analysis properly discerned that a narrative establishes | a confusion between time (succession) and logic (cause and effect). However, instead of "delogifying" time, it forced narrative time to sub-mit to narrative logic. Far from being dispelled, the confusion became the very springboard of analysis! It is high time to take advantage of this latency of the narrative, of the divorce between consequence and construction, in order to "rechronocize" succession. I will, here and now, stop wanting the story to go somewhere. I will forget what I know feebly, in advance, in order to gather the whole complexity of forces at play in a text. I will learn to resist the melody of casual relations and the torpor of narrative accumulations in order to reinvent the intensity of risks, ceaselessly menacing and forever being reborn.

#### Topical version of the aff strengthens sovereign power

Edkins and Pin-Fat 05. Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at Prifysgol Aberystwyth University (in Wales) and Veronique Pin-Fat, senior lecturer in politics at Manchester Universit, “Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005 34: pg. 14

One potential form of challenge to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe- and bios, inside and outside**.**59 As we have shown, sovereign power does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It is more appropriately considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration through relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life. In asking for a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of challenge, then, we are not asking for the elimination of power relations and consequently, we are not asking for the erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks: quite the opposite. Following Agamben, we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all between forms of life (and indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power as a form of violence can be contested and a properly political power relation (a life of power as potenza) reinstated. We could call this challenging the logic of sovereign power through refusal. Our argument is that we can evade sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting sovereign power’s assumption of the right to draw lines, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. Any other challenge always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence. To move outside it (and return to a power relation) we need not only to contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also to resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.¶ The grammar of sovereign power cannot be resisted by challenging or fighting over where the lines are drawn

. Whilst, of course, this is a strategy that can be deployed, it is not a challenge to sovereign power per se as it still tacitly or even explicitly accepts that lines must be drawn somewhere (and preferably more inclusively). Although such strategies contest the violence of sovereign power’s drawing of a particular line, they risk replicating such violence in demanding the line be drawn differently**.** This is because such forms of challenge fail to refuse sovereign power’s line-drawing ‘ethos’, an ethos which, as Agamben points out, renders us all now homines sacri or bare life.¶ Taking Agamben’s conclusion on board, we now turn to look at how the assumption of bare life can produce forms of challenge. Agamben puts it in terms of a transformation:¶ This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe-.... If we give the name form-of-life to this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life that, being its own form, remains inseparable from it we will witness the emergence of a field of research beyond the terrain defined by the intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence.60

#### Their framing of decisionmaking is elitist and violent

**Mourad, 1**

/Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of *Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education* ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” *Teachers College Record Volume* 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759/

EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower ~a follower of the social order both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? **This situation** simply **reflects that the** basic **logic of** organized **formal education and**, more generally, **the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering** or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? **The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order**. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. **This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect**. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, **that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational**,

as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about **marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism** as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

#### Their normative appeals to fairness are arbitrary and secretly violent

Olson 02 (Gary A. Olson, provost and vice president for academic affairs at Idaho State University, “Justifying belief: Stanley Fish and the work of rhetoric”)

Central to liberal political philosophy is the notion that a just society is based on such principles as "fairness," principles that supposedly exist in the abstract, independent of any specific situation or context. We are all urged to pledge allegiance not to specific persons or desired outcomes but to abstract norms that remain detached from and neutral toward particular persons and that are indifferent to outcomes. A high premium is put on such abstractions as fairness, impartiality, merit, mutual respect, neutrality, and reasonableness. Such abstractions are thought to be capable of being defined in ways that allow them to remain free from partisan agendas and, thus, are thought to be capable of serving as the foundation of legal and political policies that favor no one person or group in particular but that respect all people and groups in general. While such efforts are well intentioned, they are doomed to fail, in Fish's estimation: The problem is that any attempt to define one of these abstractions—to give it content—will always and necessarily proceed from the vantage point of some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is or should be, and it is those assumptions, contestable in fact but at the moment not contested or even acknowledged, that will really be generating the conclusions that are supposedly being generated by the logic of principle. (3) That is, whoever is attempting to define "fairness" or "mutual respect" or any other such principle will necessarily be doing so from a particular context, which includes one's personal system of values. It is impossible to rise above one's context in order to fill in the content of so-called neutral principles. Fairness, for example, will be defined differently by different people, and this abstraction will not be intelligible unless and until it is anchored in a specific standpoint. One person may feel that fairness means admitting someone to college solely of the basis of test scores, whereas another may feel that fairness means also taking into account the fact that a student comes from a context of poverty and disadvantage. No definition of fairness exists independent of the kind of conditions or substance that must be supplied by necessarily interested parties (since all parties are necessarily interested). Once some kind of substance is supplied, however, neutral principles by definition lose their neutrality. That is, the oft-touted virtue of neutral principles is that they are supposedly devoid of substantive commitments; they purportedly afford a space within which "substantive agendas can make their case without prior advantage or disadvantage" (3). Yet, some substance must be supplied in order to make the principle—fairness, in this example—intelligible. Hence, there really is no such thing as a neutral principle; there is no such thing as a principle not already informed by the substantive content of the person appealing to the principle. While questions of fairness are central to intractable policy debates, invoking the principle of fairness will not advance these debates because at a certain level such debates are about "what fairness (or neutrality or impartiality) really is" (3). In effect, a contest over the content of a particular issue is also a contest over two or more contending notions of fairness (or impartiality or whatever principle is being invoked). Even if it were possible to produce a general principle devoid of specific content—a notion of fairness, say, untethered to any specific perspective or ideological orientation—it would be of no use, says Fish, because it would by empty. That is, appealing to it would not point you in any specific direction in relation to other possible directions. Its very emptiness renders it useless as a moral compass. In effect, a neutral principle is a floating signifier, an "unoccupied vessel waiting to be filled by whoever gets to it first or with the most persuasive force" (7). In fact, it is exactly this condition of emptiness, its status as a floating signifier available for people to invest with substance, that makes neutral principles so politically useful—and even potentially dangerous, since they can be employed to further evil (as defined by you) ends just as easily as more positive (as defined by you) goals: It is because they don't have the constraining power claimed for them (they neither rule out nor mandate anything) and yet have the name of constraints (people think that when you invoke fairness you call for something determinate and determinable) that neutral principles can make an argument look as though it has a support higher or deeper than the support provided by its own substantive thrust. Indeed, the vocabulary of neutral principle can be used to disguise substance so that it appears to be the inevitable and nonengineered product of an impersonal logic. (4) In other words, a general principle such as fairness is deployed as a weapon in political, legal, and ethical struggles precisely because it masks the interestedness of those appealing to it and cloaks the fact that the actual policy, law, or proposal being advanced in the name of the principle is embedded in specific historical circumstances and furthers the interests and objectives of one set of individuals over and against the interests and objectives of others.